

A YEAR OF COVID-19

THE PANDEMIC'S IMPACT ON GLOBAL CONFLICT AND DEMONSTRATION TRENDS

> The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)

> > April 2021



A YEAR OF COVID-19: THE PANDEMIC'S IMPACT ON GLOBAL CONFLICT AND DEMONSTRATION TRENDS

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INTRODUCTION

March 2021 marks the first anniversary of the declaration of the COVID-19 pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO). One year on, this report explores ACLED's special coverage of the pandemic's impact on political violence and protest trends around the world – analyzing changes in demonstration activity, state repression, mob attacks, overall rates of armed conflict, and more through the <u>COVID-19 Disorder Tracker</u>.

Earlier in the project we took stock of evolving political violence and protest patterns during the first 16 weeks of the crisis (see this ACLED report), and again after more than five months had passed (see this <u>anal-</u> <u>ysis</u> for Foreign Policy). This report draws on a full year of data and analysis from ACLED's <u>COVID-19 Disorder</u> <u>Tracker</u> to trace the pandemic's wider effects on global disorder trends.

While demonstrations were initially interrupted as governments around the world implemented lockdowns and movement restrictions, protests ultimately resurged. Initially, this resurgence took the form of direct responses to government (mis)management of the pandemic and the immediate needs of protesters, including better access to personal protective equipment (PPE), or financial support amid the ensuing economic downturn. Soon thereafter demonstrations evolved into a continuation of the social movements that had begun prior to the crisis, with previously held grievances only exacerbated as a result of the pandemic's economic fallout and government (mis) management. In other cases, new demonstration movements emerged altogether. The combined result is that demonstrations actually increased in 2020 relative to the year prior,¹ not just despite – but in part

because of – the pandemic.

As a global emergency, the pandemic offered unique opportunities — and cover — for those in power to institute a wide range of new restrictions and pass sweeping legislation. Some capitalized on the occasion to bolster their position and consolidate authority, contributing to democratic backsliding. Others selectively enforced legislation or restrictions as a means to stifle opposition and to limit any challenge to power. Overall, state repression increased around the world.

ANALYSIS

The pandemic has also had an array of both direct and indirect effects on conflict patterns. While many hoped that the crisis would spur ceasefires in many of the world's conflicts, these hopes were largely dashed (see this report). Conflict events declined on aggregate compared to 2019, but political violence increased in more countries than it decreased, and most wars continued to rage (see this report). Rather, the coronavirus has contributed to shifting the incentive structures, opportunities, and timelines of conflict actors. In some cases, violence increased as groups seized the opportunity to ramp up their activity, especially at a time when state forces were preoccupied with the health crisis. In other cases, non-state groups, vying for greater legitimacy, tried to buy the support of local populations through 'better governance' of the pandemic than their state adversaries. In some countries, the effects of the pandemic indirectly resulted in increasing competition among armed groups, while in others, previously competing armed groups coalesced around opposition to government response to the pandemic. Yet in others still, the coronavirus disrupted the political landscape, ex-

this into account, and therefore exclude countries for which ACLED does not have data coverage for 2019.

¹ ACLED expanded to a number of new regions since March 2020; comparisons of trends between 2020 and 2019 take

acerbating long-simmering tensions.

A year on, this report marks the end of our special <u>COVID-19 Disorder Tracker</u> coverage, reviewing the dozens of spotlight pieces and special reports compiled by the ACLED team during the course of the project.² Together, these pieces help to paint a picture of the myriad ways in which the pandemic has impacted global disorder trends over the past year.

DEMONSTRATIONS

Multiple protest movements emerged around the world in 2019, driving and escalation and expansion of demonstration activity relative to the year prior. Sustained demonstration activity led into early 2020, until the WHO's pandemic declaration in March. The immediate result was a **significant decline in demonstrations around the world amid lockdown measures to control the spread of the virus** (*see visual*).


These declines were evident in countries like Chile, where protests in late 2019 were organized by students calling for socioeconomic equality and better social services. The movement resurged in March 2020 as students returned to school, but stalled with the spread of the coronavirus and new restrictions on movement (*see visual*).

A similar temporal pattern was recorded in India, which experienced a wave of demonstrations beginning in late 2019 around the Citizenship (Amendment Act. Protests declined precipitously at the start of the pandemic in March (*see visual*. Demonstrations dropped significantly in Pakistan during the same month, following the pandemic declaration (*see visual*. In Nicaragua, demonstrations declined amid the dual threats of coronavirus infection and government repression (*see this report*.

While many existing protest movements slowed in the face of lockdown restrictions and rising fears of infection, **demonstration activity over government responses to the pandemic increased**.

Across the United States, a range of drivers fueled protest patterns during the crisis, including opposition to

^{2 &}lt;u>COVID-19 Disorder Tracker</u> analysis and special reports are produced by various members of the ACLED team. As a summary review of these pieces, this report's text is drawn in some cases directly from the original analysis. Readers are encouraged to refer to the original pieces – hyperlinked throughout the text – for further information, including original author information.




COVID-19 DISORDER TRACKER: SPOTLIGHT

DEMONSTRATIONS

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
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


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Last week, for the first time in months, the number of demonstration events directly related to the COVID-19 pandemic surpassed the number of demonstration events associated with the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement (see line graph below). Data from ACLED's new US crisis Monitor project, in partnership with Princeton University's Bridging Divides Initiative, now allow us to track these trends across America in real time.



21 Jun 2020 5 Jul 2020 19 Jul 2020



COVID-19 DISORDER TRACKER: SPOTLIGHT **COVID-19 &** 8-14 NOV **Protest Patterns** US 2020

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The number of COVID-19 cases is rapidly increasing in the US, with an average of over 100,000 new cases and more than 1,000 deaths reported daily since the beginning of November. This trend is bound to continue, especially in light of record-setting air travel rates in the lead-up to the Thanksgiving holiday. Hospitalizations have already reached a record high, and deaths are projected to soon double.

The rising number of cases — and resulting deaths — are fueling demonstrations, partic linked to the government's pandemic response, which have increased sharply. The health crisis has led to a significant shift in US protest patterns.




Coronavirus-related demonstrations include both protests that are in support of or against public health restrictions. Recently, the rise has been linked most closely to demonstrations demanding more government measures to curb the pandemic, such as calls for greater protections for essential workers.

This rise in pandemic-related demonstrations has shifted patterns in protest activity across the US.

Currently, nearly 40% of all demonstrations are linked to the pandemic, with the number of coronavirus-related protests recently doubling. In contrast, under 6% of demonstrations were related to COVID-19 at the start of November.

In the immediate aftermath of the general election, over 70% of demonstrations in the US were **related to the vote**. These events include rallies in support of or against one of the presidential candidates, as well as the election itself (e.g. Stop the Steal and Count Every Vote protests).

Earlier this year, following George Floyd's killing by police in May, demonstrations **associated with the Black Lives Matter** (BLM) movement comprised over 98% of all demonstration events in the country.



Data on COVID-19 cases and deaths comes from the Centers for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC), For more, see Washington Post, 25 November 2020; CNN, 26 November 2020, 28 November 2020, 29 November 2020.

COVID-19 restrictions (*see this <u>report</u>*). Debate around whether schools should reopen for in-person teaching and mobilization by health workers demanding better safety measures — such as access to PPE — also contributed to spikes in demonstrations around the country (*see <u>visual</u>*).

More largely, protest patterns have tended to mirror COVID-19 cases in the US, with unrest over the government's management of the pandemic rising in tandem with increasing infection rates (*see visual*).


Demonstrations across East Asia also increased during the pandemic for a variety of reasons, including: demands for a stronger pandemic response from the government, such as in China; calls for economic aid for impacted businesses, such as in South Korea; and requests for general financial support, such as in Japan (see <u>visual</u>).

In Mexico, protests criticized the government's slow and unenthusiastic central response to the pandemic. Initial protests were led by health workers demanding stricter government policies and better access to PPE. Soon thereafter, labor protests rose as well, with groups demanding they be allowed to reopen businesses or asking for increased government support (*see visual*). Protests in Brazil increased too, rooted in public concerns over government mismanagement of the health crisis (*see this report*).

While restrictions on movement did much to diminish protest activity in the early days of the pandemic, real and perceived government failures to adequately address the crisis exacerbated existing grievances driving social movements prior to the coronavirus outbreak. As a result, many of the movements of 2019 and early 2020 soon returned with a vengeance, even as multiple new movements were born in reaction to poor government pandemic responses.

In Lebanon, the government has been unable to tackle the country's devastating economic crisis, the effects of which have only been aggravated by lockdown restrictions. Violent demonstrations have broken out over deepening mistrust of Lebanon's political elites, with a surge of events beginning in late April (see <u>visual</u>).

Similarly, the fallout from the pandemic has worsened the economic crisis in Tunisia, leading to a revival of demonstration activity across the country



(see this report).

In Iran, popular concerns over widespread corruption, poor service delivery, and economic hardship all exacerbated by the pandemic — fueled opposition to the regime and sparked a wave of prison riots (*see* <u>visual</u>).

Likewise, in Argentina, the government's response to the health crisis and the subsequent economic fallout has contributed to a rise in anti-government demonstrations amid protests over a controversial abortion law (see <u>visual</u>).

In the US, the massive wave of demonstrations associated with the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement that began over the summer is intertwined with the onset of the pandemic. The 2020 phase of BLM became one of the largest protest movements in US history in part because it emerged within a socio-economic environment deeply disrupted by the health crisis. Those who lost their jobs and livelihoods are more likely to participate in protests, and the pandemic's direct and indirect effects have both been felt unequally. The number of Black Americans working in frontline jobs impacted by the pandemic is disproportionately high, Black workers continue to earn less than their white counterparts, and almost half of Black households are concerned with their ability to make rent on a monthly basis. By August 2020, COVID-19 emerged as the third largest cause of death among the Black population in the US (see this report).


Protests simultaneously rose in Serbia amid allegations of unfair elections and criticism of the government's pandemic response beginning in May (see <u>visual</u>).


Similarly, in Chile, the government's economic response to the coronavirus pandemic led to a spike in labor demonstrations across the country over the summer (see <u>visual</u>).

Demonstrations surged in the aftermath of Peru's national lockdown over the summer as well, resulting in one of the largest increases recorded by ACLED during the pandemic. Despite an early lockdown, by August, Peru had one of the highest excess death rates linked to COVID-19 in the world (*see visual*).

Meanwhile, in Hong Kong, demonstration activity re-

26 APR -2 MAY 2020 A NEW WAVE of UNREST IN **LEBANON**





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sumed as authorities began loosening coronavirus-related restrictions (*see visual*). Demonstrations spiked in May and June before the Chinese government imposed a new national security law and cracked down on pro-democracy activism in the city (*see infographic*).

In short, despite the pandemic — and at times because of the crisis — demonstrations ultimately increased in more countries than they decreased last year. Between 2019 and 2020, demonstration activity rose by 7% worldwide (see this <u>report</u>).

TARGETED VIOLENCE

The onset of the pandemic paved the way for a number of distinct forms of targeted violence.

The first has been state repression. Some states, especially in the early days of the pandemic, took a heavy-handed approach to enforcing coronavirus-related restrictions like lockdowns.


For example, in late March 2020, Uganda experienced its highest disorder levels in over a decade as a result of the government's violent enforcement of lockdown restrictions (*see visual*). State violence against civilians accounted for nearly half of all recorded events during this period.

Similarly, in Nigeria, state targeting of civilians and demonstrators spiked in April as authorities violently enforced coronavirus restrictions (*see <u>visual</u>*).

In South Africa, while most types of violence decreased following the coronavirus outbreak, violence against civilians more than doubled by early April as a result of heavy-handed lockdown enforcement (*see* <u>visual</u>).

Some political leaders used the pandemic as an opportunity to stifle opposition and tighten their grip on power. These leaders capitalized on emergency powers granted during the crisis to suppress criticism and popular mobilization. The unique state of emergency provided them with cover to consolidate authority, contributing to democratic backsliding in multiple countries around the world since the start of the coronavirus outbreak.

For example, the pandemic has strengthened the po-



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sition of states across West Africa. Governments have subtly exploited the crisis to repress opposition and to manipulate elections (*see this <u>report</u>*). In Guinea, where there had been large-scale demonstrations against proposed constitutional changes since October 2019, the health crisis allowed the regime to push forward with the changes, silence protests, elect and install a new parliament, arrest opposition leaders, and deflect international attention (*see this <u>report</u>*).

In Venezuela, *de facto* President Nicolas Maduro announced lockdowns in the early days of the pandemic, limiting ongoing protests in opposition to his regime in late March (*see <u>visual</u>*).


In Bolivia, the repeated rescheduling of elections amid the pandemic triggered unrest across the country over the summer, with critics accusing the government of postponing the votes in an attempt to retain control (*see visual*).


In response to the pandemic and the rising threat of the Islamic State in Sinai, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi took steps to tighten his grip on power. He moved to shore up his position in late April, ratifying new amendments to the country's emergency law, granting himself additional sweeping authorities that allowed him to ban or limit public gatherings, even outside of health emergencies. While the government says the measures are meant to deal with the pandemic, the majority of the amendments are not clearly tied to public health issues (see <u>visual</u>).

In Algeria, the government exploited COVID-19 restrictions to suppress political dissent during an upsurge in unrest. With the world's attention fixed on the pandemic, Algerian authorities pushed through prosecutions targeting activists, journalists, and supporters of the anti-government Hirak movement in May (see <u>visual</u>).

Globally, state targeting of the media increased last year under the guise of COVID-19 restrictions. Many states used the pandemic as a pretext to impose new limitations on civil liberties and to intensify repression (*see visual*).


Other types of targeted violence — **such as Mob Violence** — **also increased during the pandemic** (see <u>visual</u>).





The rising threat of the Islamic State – Wilayat Sinai in Egypt, the strain of the global health crisis, and growing domestic unrest over the pandemic response leaves Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi in a vulnerable position.


His solution: silencing news of militant attacks and pushing through new amendments to tighten his grip on power.



Following the attack on the towers, Egyptian authorities prohibited the media from publishing any news of the incident (though the state denies these claims). Details of the attack would suggest that the government is vulnerable to the growing security threat in Sinai. Such exposure, at a time when the state is already spread thin combatting both the pandemic and popular discontent with its management of the crisis, could threaten the president's hold on power.



For more, see: Al-Monitor, 5 Apr 2020, 7 May 2020; Human Rights Watch, 7 May 2020; Al Jazeera, 9 May 2020; Washington Post, 10 May 2020.




COVID-19 DISORDER TRACKER: SPOTLIGHT

MAY 2020 ALGERIA & the Hirak Movement

The Hirak Movement began in Algeria in February 2019, following then-President Bouteflika's announced candidacy for a fifth presidential term, and were centered on widespread anti-government sentiment. The protests — with some of the largest crowds since 2011's Arab Spring — helped to usher Bouteflika's resignation in April 2019. Yet the demonstration movement continues, protesting against elite politics in the country. The movement had been holding weekly demonstrations for over a year before COVID-19 movement restrictions slowed things down (see graph below).

There are reports that the Algerian government has been exploiting COVID-19 restrictions to suppress political dissent in the country. Amnesty International reports: "At the time when all national and international eyes are focused on the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Algerian authorities are investing time in accelerating prosecutions and trials against activists, journalists and supporters of the Hirak movement."

Activists have recently been sentenced for creating memes critical of the President and for criticizing authorities on Facebook. These arrests have prompted spikes in demonstration activity in recent weeks (*see both graph and map below*).




For more, see: Amnesty International, 27 April 2020; Middle East Eye, 29 April 2020, 21 May 2020; ACLED, 8 March 2019, 13 June 2019


State repression is expected to rise, especially in authoritarian states, under the guise of strict adherence to health security standards. One of these tactics has been attacks on the media – specifically violence against journalists. The map below depicts these trends since the start of 2020.

In **Orange** on the map are countries where there have been reports of **violence against journalists** linked to their coverage of COVID-19.


In **navy** on the map are countries where there have been reports of *restrictions placed on the media*, which can be precursors to such violence.



5-11 APR 2020 Healthcare Under Workers Siege



COVID-19 DISORDER TRACKER: SPOTLIGHT



COVID-19 DISORDER TRACKER: SPOTLIGHT 10 - 16 Political violence in the path of MAY 2020 CYCLONE AMPHAN

Cyclone Amphan, one of the most powerful in decades, made landfall in India's West Bengal state on the afternoon of May 20. As the cyclone approached from the Bay of Bengal, millions of people were in the process of evacuation from India's West Bengal and Bangladesh. The global pandemic, however, has made evacuations more difficult.

Adding further complication has been the recent rise in mob violence and civilian targeting in this region in the wake of the pandemic. The evacuation and housing of affected residents in shelters may lead to an increase in disorder, as people fear sharing confined space with others due to the surge of coronavirus cases in the region. Such fears have motivated much of the violence in this region in recent weeks.

In India's West Bengal, clashes occurred over the course of several days last week after Muslims were barred from using week after Muslims were barred from using public toilets following reports of positive COVID-19 cases in their neighborhood. Reports indicate that the violence was coordinated and systematically targeted towards the Muslim community, a trend mirrored across much of the country following announcements blaming Muslims for spread of the coronavirus. Events in I e in 2020 Mob Violence Ev Bengal State i Bhutar itical Violence gladesh & India's engal State, 2021 JO . o ° 80 00 15 Mar 26 Apr 2 Feb In Bangladesh, an anti-Muslim social media post Number of Events sparked attacks against a shop belonging to a Hindu owner, thought to be the source of the post. At least 10 people were injured during the incident. In recent years, social media posts and fake online news have triggered several clashes in Bangladesh.) 10) 15 ents Fatalities 10 **Civilian Targeting** of Ev (Bangladesh, 2020 ted 5 Ren 0 29 Dec 12 Jan 26 Jan 9 Feb 23 Feb 8 Mar 22 Mar 5 Apr 19 Apr 3 May For more, see: BBC, 19 May 2020, The Wire, 16 May 2020; Deutsche-Welle, 1 Nov 2019; Washington Post, 19 May 2020.

Mobs have attacked authorities enforcing lockdowns, healthcare workers (*see <u>visual</u>*), and suspected carriers of the coronavirus.

Tensions over lockdown restrictions and infection fears are aggravated when compounded with other stressors, such as environmental disasters like Cyclone Amphan in South Asia last May (see <u>visual</u>).

Political violence targeting women also remained a major threat during the pandemic. Attacks on women in the public sphere continued unabated during the crisis — sometimes at rates consistent to those recorded before the coronavirus outbreak (see <u>visual</u>).

ARMED CONFLICT

At the start of the pandemic, many hoped that COVID-19 could bring warring parties to the negotiating table, with the UN calling for a global truce to deal with the health crisis. **Yet the ceasefire appeal has not had the desired result** (see this <u>report</u>).

In Yemen, for example, the ceasefire did not hold (*see visual*), with the pandemic leaving warring parties largely undeterred in the south (*see visual*).

In the Philippines, unilateral ceasefires declared by both the state and the New People's Army in March also failed to significantly reduce violence (*see visual*).

In the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine, ceasefire violations have continued throughout the pandemic (*see visual*). Although a July ceasefire and deescalation agreement has succeeded in significantly decreasing the intensity of the conflict, fighting remains ongoing (*see this report*).

In many countries, conflict continued with no new ceasefires, and with violent actors undeterred.

In Somalia, Al Shabaab launched daily attacks in May, hindering humanitarian efforts to fight the spread of coronavirus (*see visual*). Al Shabaab ultimately escalated its activity by 33% last year — one of the greatest increases recorded for any conflict actor between 2019 and 2020 (*see this report*).

India faced active conflicts on multiple fronts during the pandemic — against militant groups in Jammu


COVID-19 DISORDER TRACKER: SPOTLIGHT

Political violence targeting women amidst the coronavirus pandemic

As lockdown measures go into effect around the world, women are at heightened risk of domestic violence. Yet the threat to women is not solely limited to violence inside the home: ACLED data show that political violence targeting women in the public sphere has continued unabated through the COVID-19 crisis – at rates consistent to those recorded before the pandemic.

While lockdowns have stifled demonstrations featuring women following the spike around International Women's Day on 8 March (orange line below), coronavirus restrictions have had little effect on the threat of political violence targeting women (navy line below).

This violence is largely rooted in patriarchal power dynamics aimed at creating a high-risk public space in which women are humiliated, oppressed, and ultimately discouraged from political participation. At a time when many regimes are seizing the opportunity to bolster state power, women continue to be a prime target of violence and repression (depicted in the map below).



On the eve of the fifth anniversary of the Saudi-led air campaign, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres urger. Yemen's warring parties to suspend hostilities to prepare for a COVID-19 outbreak. This comes as Yemen enters a new spiral of escalating conflict, characterized by renewed ground clashes and an intensification of coalition air strikes and Houthi missile attacks.

COVID-19 DISORDER TRACKER: SPOTLIGHT

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
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
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CONFLICT

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and Kashmir, Pakistani forces in the Kashmir region, and Naxal-Maoist rebels in the 'Red Corridor' (*see visual*). It was ultimately among the countries with the highest number of civilian targeting events in the world last year (*see this report*).

In some conflicts, actors have used the pandemic as an opportunity to escalate campaigns or to push their advantage (see <u>visual</u>).

In Mozambique, the pandemic failed to stymie Islamist militants in northeastern Cabo Delgado, where the insurgents stepped up attacks against civilians and armed forces in April (*see <u>visual</u>*). 2020 proved to be the deadliest year for the Cabo Delgado conflict yet (*see this <u>report</u>*).


The health crisis significantly impacted political disorder patterns across northeast India, increasing the risk of instability and unrest (*see this <u>report</u>*). Fighting escalated in the Jammu & Kashmir region as well over the summer (*see <u>visual</u>*), with 2020 marking the most violent year for cross-border conflict between India and Pakistan since the beginning of ACLED coverage in 2016 (*see this <u>report</u>*).


The Turkish military intensified operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey as well as in Iraq last year (see <u>visual</u>). In total, the Turkish military ramped up activity by 32% in 2020, resulting in one of the largest increases in activity across all conflict actors relative to the year prior. Iraq also registered one of the largest escalations in conflict of any country in the world last year, with an increase of 38% between 2019 and 2020 (see this <u>report</u>).

In Myanmar, conflict rose in the lead up to the general election in November, despite a rapid increase in coronavirus cases (*see <u>visual</u>*).

Elsewhere, Israeli settlers and state forces increased attacks on Palestinians in the West Bank in the early days of the pandemic. Relative impunity for settlers, crackdowns by police, and COVID-19 restrictions ensuring crowded close quarters may have all contributed to the violence (*see visual*).

Many jihadi groups around the world escalated their operations during the pandemic. There was a rise in





Mozambique

200+

The number of reported civilian fatalities recorded by ACLED in Cabo Delgado province from 1 January 2020 to 25 April 2020, totalling more than 700 since October 2017.

COVID-19 DISORDER TRACKER: SPOTLIGHT MAY 2020 PKK & Turkey


ecurity forces are accused of opening n vessels carrying fishermen and trad l Ibo Island, killing at least 18 people.

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
On 10 January, the Turkish military announced the beginning of a new operation against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the rural regions of Turkey near the border with Iraq – the first of several small operations against the PKK in 2020. Since the announcement, engagements between Turkish state forces and the PKK have increased, following a decline at the end of 2019. However, Turkey's campaign against the PKK has not been limited to Turkish soil: the military has increasingly used air strikes against PKK forces in Iraq, where a majority of interactions between the PKK and the Turkish military have occurred. The renewed campaign against the PKK demonstrates the Turkish state's desire to increase security in southeastern Turkey by pushing armed engagements towards Iraq.



COVID-19 DISORDER TRACKER: SPOTLIGHT

Sept Continuing Conflict in Jammu & Kashmir 2020

More than a year after the Indian government revoked Jammu & Kashmir's limited autonomy through a controversial constitutional amendment widely viewed as anti-Muslim, tensions in the region remain high. India faces multiple conflicts in Jammu & Kashmir that have escalated during the coronavirus pandemic. Clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces along the border have coincided with an increase in operations by Indian state forces against various militant groups.



COVID-19 DISORDER TRACKER: SPOTLIGHT

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Week of Event Date


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
COVID-19 and Conflict


As the general elections scheduled for 8 November approach, Myanmar is facing a rapid increase in coronavirus cases. Myanmar now has the third highest coronavirus mortality rate in Southeast Asia.* The second wave of the pandemic started in Rakhine state where conflict persists between the military and the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), an ethnic Rakhine armed group fighting for greater autonomy. As the rainy season that the the the transmit the time greater due on the season of the transmitted by the second wave of the transmitted by the tran



Ethnic Minorities Disenfranchised

Disenfranchised The Union Election Commission (UEC) has nonunced the cancelation of voiting in mar townships and village tracts in ethnic unionity areas across the country. Security concerns were cited as the reason for the cancelations. However, the initial list of form been reported, such as Paletwa often been reported, such as Paletwa township in Chin state, while including area that have been relatively stable. A revised il has included areas of Paletwa township an evoked the cancelations in a few locations Dissatisfaction remains, though, as the decision making process lacks transparent and a clear set of orteria for determining where the vote should or should not be canceled. The NLD stands to benefit from the cancelations, as areas where ethnic-based parties enjoy a stronghold wis e most impacted. Meanwhile, the hundres of thousands of Rohingy astill in Rakhine as the suman disenfranchised. The conflict in Rakhine and Chin states has taken a toll on cuisinars. The military has carried out a campaign of indiscriminate shelling of villages along the Kaladan and Mayu rivers. Meanwhile, the UL/AA has adopted a strategy of abductions. Most recently, the group abducted three members of the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD). The UL/AA has claimed it would release the NLD members if certain detained politicians and students were released. Several university students have been detained recently for calling for an end to <u>the ongoing conflict</u> in Rakhine and Chin states.





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Islamic State activity, for example, with major attacks reported in the early days of the crisis as the group sought to exploit the stress that outbreaks were placing on governments (*see <u>visual</u>*).

Al Qaeda-affiliate Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin' (JNIM) saw COVID-19 as a "god-sent soldier" weakening the Malian army (see <u>visual</u>).

Elsewhere in Africa, the conflict in Libya escalated as fighting intensified at the start of the pandemic in March (*see <u>visual</u>*).


In fact, violence increased on aggregate across the African continent in 2020 compared to 2019 (see this piece in the Mail & Guardian).

In addition to the pandemic's direct impacts on ongoing conflicts, multiple indirect effects have also had violent consequences.

For example, the killing of social leaders in Colombia has risen dramatically over the past year, hastened by the deteriorating security situation in rural areas during the pandemic. Challenges in implementing the commitments made during agreements between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), as well as the presence of other armed actors, have resulted in new threats. Disputes over territory and resources, aggravated by the health crisis, have exacerbated these trends (*see this report*). Specifically, the perpetrators and locations of attacks on civilians have shifted during the pandemic (*see visual*), with social leaders and other vulnerable groups facing heightened risks of violence (*see this* <u>report</u>).

In Brazil, opposing governance strategies in response to the pandemic led to rising tensions and violence in April. On the national stage, tensions increased between the president and state governors over how to deal with the health crisis. On the local level, as in Rio de Janeiro state, tensions around the pandemic response — this time between drug trafficking groups and police militias — resulted in a spike in deadly violence (*see visual*).

The closure of borders in Central America as a result of the pandemic disrupted criminal economies in Mexico, leading to increased competition amongst gangs



15 Mar

29 Mar 12 Apr

1 Mar

16 Feb

19 Ian

5 Jan

2 Feb

and cartels beginning in March (see visual).

Conversely, the pandemic fostered collaboration among armed groups in the US. Right-wing mobilization against COVID-19 restrictions has been a crucial means for far-right armed groups to build networks around the country. Rallies have provided locations for both unaffiliated individuals as well as organized groups to express their politics, connect, and establish coalitions (see this <u>report</u>).


In Afghanistan, the Taliban has taken a multi-pronged approach to bolstering its legitimacy during the pandemic, especially as it vies for increased concessions during negotiations with the US-backed Afghan government. This included attempts to present itself as the more capable governance alternative through efforts to combat COVID-19, such as declaring it would cease fighting in areas under its control if there was an outbreak, holding workshops on preventing the spread of the virus, and distributing PPE to locals (*see visual*).

In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte ordered state forces to "shoot dead" citizens who violated lockdown measures — a credible threat in a country where similar threats against 'drug suspects' are regularly enforced. The result was a sharp decline in violence against civilians in March as local communities adhered to lockdown restrictions and remained out of the public sphere. These trends soon reversed by May, however, with violence against civilians ultimately returning to levels seen before lockdown measures were put into place (*see <u>visual</u>*).

In South Sudan, the coronavirus outbreak heavily impacted the country's political situation, with dozens of senior elites testing positive for COVID-19 in the first few months of the pandemic. With the sharp fall in global oil prices threatening South Sudan's budget, the spread of the virus has exacerbated existing tensions in the country (see <u>visual</u>).

In neighboring Sudan, the pandemic compounded an already dire economic situation by reducing tax and oil revenues and squeezing the informal sector, prompting new demonstrations (*see <u>visual</u>*).

The health crisis also led to a wave of prison unrest around the world as inmates face both additional



restrictions and heightened risks of infection (see visual).

Prison unrest was particularly pronounced in Italy – home to the second-highest number of coronavirus cases after China in early March 2020. The result was that the government and regional authorities deployed a variety of restrictions at different points throughout the year, with measures rippling through detention facilities and fueling a series of violent demonstrations and mob violence events (*see this <u>re-</u>port*).

In the US, prisoners and detainees have also attempted to bring awareness to infection risks and poor detention conditions by demonstrating and calling on authorities to take a stronger approach to preventing outbreaks. When demonstrations fail to garner a response, some inmates have launched hunger strikes or riots. Demonstrations by prisoners are frequently met with force: in more than a third — over 37% — of all peaceful coronavirus-related protests held by prisoners and detainees, guards have used force like fir-ing pepper spray and pepper balls (*see this <u>report</u>*).

CONCLUSION

The pandemic has not impacted any two states in exactly the same way, with its effects on disorder patterns shaped by the distinct circumstances of each country's political and conflict landscape. The full range of analysis produced through the <u>COVID-19</u> <u>Disorder Tracker</u> — outlined in this report — underscores the importance of combining robust quantitative data on political violence and protest trends with qualitative insights to allow for nuanced assessments of these effects, factoring in each country's unique context.

While this report marks the end of the <u>COVID-19 Dis</u>order Tracker's special coverage, ACLED will continue to collect real-time data on political violence and protest around the world — including direct <u>corona-virus-related disorder</u> events — making data publicly available so that users can monitor the impacts of the health crisis into the future.

